Wolfssl

By the Year

In 2026 there have been 73 vulnerabilities in Wolfssl with an average score of 7.5 out of ten. Last year, in 2025 Wolfssl had 12 security vulnerabilities published. That is, 61 more vulnerabilities have already been reported in 2026 as compared to last year.

Recent Wolfssl Security Vulnerabilities

CVE	Date	Vulnerability	Products
CVE-2026-7511	Jun 25, 2026	wolfSSL PKCS7_verify Signer Confusion Forged Signature Acceptance PKCS7_verify signer confusion allows forged signatures, where the signer associated with a signature is not correctly bound, permitting a forged signature to be accepted.	Wolfssl
CVE-2026-7532	Jun 25, 2026	WolfSSL IP Address Name Constraints Bypass (CVE-2026-7532) iPAddress name constraints bypass when WOLFSSL_IP_ALT_NAME is not defined. IP address name constraints are not enforced in that configuration, allowing a certificate to bypass an issuing CA's IP address constraints.	Wolfssl
CVE-2026-8720	Jun 25, 2026	wolfSSL 5.9.0 HMAC-BLAKE2 MAC Independent of Message when Key > Block Size wc_Blake2bHmacFinal and wc_Blake2sHmacFinal discard the message when the key length exceeds the block size, producing a MAC that is independent of the input. When the supplied key is longer than the BLAKE2 block size the key-hashing branch reinitialized the running hash state, discarding the accumulated message data, so the resulting MAC depended only on the key and not on the message being authenticated. This bug is specific to the HMAC-BLAKE2 APIs that were added in wolfSSL version 5.9.0.	Wolfssl
CVE-2026-10098	Jun 25, 2026	wolfSSL OCSP CertID Serial-Length Confusion Vulnerability OCSP CertID serial-number length-confusion in wolfSSL_OCSP_resp_find_status allows a same-issuer SingleResponse whose serial is a prefix of the target serial to be reported as the revocation status of a different certificate. The lookup compared serial-number bytes without first requiring the two serial numbers to be of equal length, so a SingleResponse for one certificate (same issuer) whose serial is a prefix of the target's serial would match, returning the wrong certificate's status. The fix requires the serial lengths to be equal before comparing the serial bytes.	Wolfssl
CVE-2026-11703	Jun 25, 2026	wolfSSL CVE-2026-11703: Missing SNI/ALPN binding on session resumption Missing SNI/ALPN binding on stateful (session-ID) resumption, which previously skipped the binding check performed for ticket-based resumption. A cached session could be resumed under a different SNI/ALPN than originally negotiated and, where client-authentication policy differs across virtual hosts, carry the cached peer-authentication state into a context it was not established for. Resumption now verifies the SNI/ALPN binding for all paths and declines (falling back to a full handshake) on mismatch.	Wolfssl
CVE-2026-55962	Jun 25, 2026	wolfSSL TLS1.3 Post-Handshake Auth flaw (CVE202655962) TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) issue where a server could accept a client's Finished message without the client having sent a Certificate and CertificateVerify. The post-handshake-auth exemption that allows an empty/absent peer certificate was only intended for the initial handshake, but it was also being applied while a post-handshake CertificateRequest was still outstanding. The check is now scoped to the initial handshake only: on the server, once a post-handshake CertificateRequest has been sent (certReqCtx is set), a peer certificate and a valid CertificateVerify are required again before the Finished is accepted, with empty-certificate handling following the configured verify mode (FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) just as during first-handshake client authentication. Only affects TLS 1.3 servers built with post-handshake authentication support (WOLFSSL_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH / --enable-postauth, included in --enable-all) that enable WOLFSSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE and request a client certificate after the handshake via wolfSSL_request_certificate(). Clients, and servers that do not use post-handshake authentication, are unaffected.	Wolfssl
CVE-2026-6092	Jun 25, 2026	wolfSSL E2M enforcement flaw: falls back to MAC-then-Encrypt When HAVE_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC is configured, the implementation could fall back to MAC-then-Encrypt rather than enforcing Encrypt-then-MAC.	Wolfssl
CVE-2026-6325	Jun 25, 2026	wolfSSL OOB Write in SetSuitesHashSigAlgo via Oversized Sig Algo List Out-of-bounds write in SetSuitesHashSigAlgo when processing an oversized signature algorithms list, allowing a write past the bounds of the destination buffer.	Wolfssl
CVE-2026-6329	Jun 25, 2026	wolfSSL PKCS#12 MAC Integrity Bypass via Attacker-Controlled Length PKCS#12 MAC verification uses an attacker-controlled comparison length, weakening the integrity check on the MAC and allowing a mismatched MAC to be accepted. The PKCS#12 verify path compared the locally computed HMAC against the MAC parsed from the PKCS#12 structure using a length taken directly from the attacker-supplied input, without first verifying that it equals the length of the digest actually produced by the configured algorithm. A truncated or zero-length stored MAC could therefore be accepted, defeating the integrity protection of the MAC.	Wolfssl
CVE-2026-6330	Jun 25, 2026	wolfSSL ARM64 NEON Half-Cipher Compare Weakens IND-CCA2 The ML-KEM ARM64 NEON ciphertext comparison only compares half of the input, breaking the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform's implicit rejection and weakening IND-CCA2 security on that code path. The constant-time comparison effectively ignored part of the re-encrypted ciphertext, so a decapsulating party could fail to detect a manipulated ciphertext and proceed without the standard's required implicit rejection.	Wolfssl