Apache Kudu
By the Year
In 2024 there have been 0 vulnerabilities in Apache Kudu . Kudu did not have any published security vulnerabilities last year.
Year | Vulnerabilities | Average Score |
---|---|---|
2024 | 0 | 0.00 |
2023 | 0 | 0.00 |
2022 | 0 | 0.00 |
2021 | 2 | 5.90 |
2020 | 0 | 0.00 |
2019 | 0 | 0.00 |
2018 | 0 | 0.00 |
It may take a day or so for new Kudu vulnerabilities to show up in the stats or in the list of recent security vulnerabilties. Additionally vulnerabilities may be tagged under a different product or component name.
Recent Apache Kudu Security Vulnerabilities
Netty is an open-source
CVE-2021-21409
5.9 - Medium
- March 30, 2021
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.61.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. The content-length header is not correctly validated if the request only uses a single Http2HeaderFrame with the endStream set to to true. This could lead to request smuggling if the request is proxied to a remote peer and translated to HTTP/1.1. This is a followup of GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj/CVE-2021-21295 which did miss to fix this one case. This was fixed as part of 4.1.61.Final.
HTTP Request Smuggling
Netty is an open-source
CVE-2021-21295
5.9 - Medium
- March 09, 2021
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.
HTTP Request Smuggling
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