Zephyr Zephyrproject Zephyr

Don't miss out!

Thousands of developers use stack.watch to stay informed.
Get an email whenever new security vulnerabilities are reported in Zephyrproject Zephyr.

By the Year

In 2026 there have been 71 vulnerabilities in Zephyrproject Zephyr with an average score of 5.8 out of ten. Last year, in 2025 Zephyr had 4 security vulnerabilities published. That is, 67 more vulnerabilities have already been reported in 2026 as compared to last year. Last year, the average CVE base score was greater by 2.72




Year Vulnerabilities Average Score
2026 71 5.78
2025 4 8.50
2024 20 7.74
2023 26 8.21
2022 14 7.06
2021 23 7.68
2020 17 7.92
2019 3 0.00
2018 1 9.80

It may take a day or so for new Zephyr vulnerabilities to show up in the stats or in the list of recent security vulnerabilities. Additionally vulnerabilities may be tagged under a different product or component name.

Recent Zephyrproject Zephyr Security Vulnerabilities

Zephyr USB CDC NCM CVE-2026-12052: Control-to-Host Buffer Overflow
CVE-2026-12052 5.2 - Medium - August 11, 2026

The USB device-side CDC NCM class control-to-host handler usbd_cdc_ncm_cth in subsys/usb/device_next/class/usbd_cdc_ncm.c builds a fixed-size response for the GET_NTB_PARAMETERS (28-byte struct ntb_parameters) and GET_NTB_INPUT_SIZE (8-byte struct ntb_input_size) class requests and copies the whole structure into the control DATA IN buffer with net_buf_add_mem(buf, ..., sizeof(...)), ignoring the host-supplied wLength. The control DATA IN buffer is allocated by the USB stack with a capacity of exactly wLength bytes (usbd_ep_ctrl_data_in_alloc -> udc_ctrl_data_alloc -> net_buf_alloc_len(&udc_ep_pool, wLength); no round-up is applied for the IN endpoint). Because net_buf_add_mem/net_buf_simple_add only bounds the copy with an __ASSERT_NO_MSG, which is compiled out in production builds, a host that issues one of these standard CDC NCM control requests with a wLength smaller than the response structure (e.g. wLength = 1) causes the handler to memcpy up to 27 bytes past the end of the allocated pool buffer. The request fields come straight from the USB SETUP packet, so any host (or USB interposer) the Zephyr device enumerates against can trigger the overflow with no authentication once an image built with the device_next USB stack and the CDC NCM class is connected. The out-of-bounds write corrupts adjacent allocations and metadata in the shared udc_ep_pool, primarily causing memory corruption and denial of service of the USB stack; the overflow length is bounded (<= 27 bytes) and the written content is fixed device constants, and the bug reads nothing back so there is no information disclosure. The fix clamps the copy with MIN(sizeof(...), setup->wLength), matching the existing CDC ACM handler.

Memory Corruption

Zephyr USB DFU Null Pointer Deref in handle_download()
CVE-2026-12051 4.6 - Medium - August 11, 2026

The USB DFU class implementation in Zephyr's new (experimental) device_next USB device stack contains a NULL pointer dereference in handle_download() (subsys/usb/device_next/class/usbd_dfu.c). The handler computes MIN(setup->wLength, buf->len) and passes buf->data to the image write callback without checking that the buf net_buf pointer is non-NULL. The handler is reached over the USB control endpoint, driven by the USB host. For a DFU_DNLOAD (download) request with no Data OUT stage notably the zero-length terminating download that the DFU protocol uses to end a firmware transfer the USB core invokes the class handler with a NULL buffer. After the device has been advanced to the DFU_DNLOAD_IDLE state (by sending one valid download block and a GET_STATUS), a zero-length DFU_DNLOAD reaches handle_download() with buf == NULL, dereferencing it. The result is a NULL+offset read that triggers a fatal CPU fault, i.e. a denial of service (device crash/reset). The attacker is whatever controls the USB host the device is attached to; DFU download support must be enabled with a registered image. There is no memory corruption or information disclosure impact is limited to availability. The fix adds an explicit if (buf != NULL) guard so the callback receives a zero-length, NULL-data transfer instead of crashing.

NULL Pointer Dereference

Doublefree in Realtek BEE Bluetooth HCI driver (CVE-2026-11894)
CVE-2026-11894 5.9 - Medium - August 11, 2026

The Realtek BEE Bluetooth HCI driver's send callback, bt_hci_bee_send() in drivers/bluetooth/hci/hci_bee.c, violated the bt_hci_driver_api buffer-ownership contract. That contract requires the driver to consume (unref) the transmit net_buf only on success; on an error return the host caller retains ownership and unrefs the buffer itself. The pre-fix code routed all error paths through a shared cleanup label that unconditionally called net_buf_unref(buf) before returning the error code. Because the host TX paths (in subsys/bluetooth/host/hci_core.c) unref the buffer again after send() returns an error, the buffer is freed twice: the driver returns it to its net_buf pool and the host then unrefs the already-freed buffer, corrupting the shared pool / underflowing the reference count (CWE-415). The same error branch additionally dereferenced buf->len inside a LOG_ERR call after the buffer had already been unref'd, a read of freed memory (CWE-416) that is compiled in at the default error log level. The failing edges are reached when the controller's host-to-controller buffer allocation fails or the controller send fails (resource-exhaustion / IO conditions). A remote Bluetooth peer can push the device toward these conditions indirectly by driving heavy host transmit activity, at which point the double-free corrupts the host net_buf pool and most likely crashes the device, with residual potential for further memory corruption. The impact is confined to builds using this specific Realtek BEE HCI driver. The fix returns early from each error path without unreffing and unrefs the buffer only on the success path, restoring the ownership contract and eliminating both the double-free and the use-after-free read.

Double-free

Zephyr ARM FPU leakage via unshared context switch
CVE-2026-11985 3.6 - Low - August 11, 2026

On the Zephyr ARM port, enabling the hardware FPU (CONFIG_FPU) forces the "Floating point ABI" choice, which defaults to CONFIG_FP_HARDABI. Both FP_HARDABI and FP_SOFTABI permit the compiler to emit hardware FP instructions in any function, even code that never uses floating-point types. However, the callee-saved FP registers (s16-s31 / d8-d15) are only saved and restored across a context switch when CONFIG_FPU_SHARING is enabled (arch/arm/core/cortex_m/swap_helper.S and arch/arm/core/cortex_a_r/swap_helper.S), and prior to this fix selecting an ABI did not enable FPU register sharing, which defaults off. In a build that enables the FPU with the default ABI but leaves CONFIG_FPU_SHARING disabled, the kernel preserves no callee-saved FP register state across thread switches. The documented precondition for this "unshared" mode that only a single thread ever executes FP instructions is silently violated because the compiler may generate FP instructions in every thread. Under CONFIG_USERSPACE, where threads are mutually isolated, this becomes an information-disclosure boundary crossing: a victim thread can leave secret-derived values in s16-s31, and a co-resident unprivileged thread can read those registers directly (FP register access is not privilege-gated), recovering data left behind by another thread. Without userspace the same defect causes cross-thread FP state corruption (a correctness fault). The leak is bounded to the 16 callee-saved single-precision registers and is opportunistic, so impact is low. The fix makes FP_HARDABI and FP_SOFTABI select CONFIG_FPU_SHARING and tags every thread with K_FP_REGS at creation, so callee-saved FP state is always preserved across context switches whenever the compiler may emit FP instructions.

Information Disclosure

Duplicate Unref in Zephyr BLE HCI Driver (hci_bflb) Causing UAF
CVE-2026-11893 5.9 - Medium - August 11, 2026

The Bluetooth HCI driver for Bouffalo Lab on-chip BLE controllers (BL60x/BL70x/BL61x), bt_bflb_send() in drivers/bluetooth/hci/hci_bflb.c, violates the bt_hci_driver_api.send() buffer-ownership contract. That contract (documented at include/zephyr/drivers/bluetooth.h) requires the buffer reference to be consumed only on success; on error the caller still owns the reference and unrefs it. The driver instead routed all error paths through a shared label that unconditionally called net_buf_unref(buf) before returning the error code, consuming the buffer on failure as well. When send() returns an error, the host TX path (send_buf() in subsys/bluetooth/host/conn.c) unrefs the same buffer again, believing it still owns it. This double-unref over-decrements the net_buf reference count. Because the buffer is a TX fragment whose destroy callback also decrements its still-queued parent buffer, the parent is freed prematurely while reachable on the connection TX queue, producing a use-after-free and corruption of the shared net_buf pool rather than a benign leak. The error conditions are on the host-to-controller transmit path (controller send failure, or an unsupported H:4 packet type), so they are not driven directly by attacker-supplied radio bytes; a remote/adjacent peer can influence them only indirectly, e.g. by inducing controller TX failures under heavy link load. The consequence when reached is BLE-stack denial of service (crash / pool corruption) with possible further memory corruption, bounded to devices using one of these Bouffalo Lab on-chip controllers.

Double-free

Zephyr UpdateHub OOB Write in ctx.fds causing DoS
CVE-2026-11812 2.5 - Low - August 10, 2026

The UpdateHub management subsystem (subsys/mgmt/updatehub/updatehub.c) drives every update operation through a single file-scope ctx structure that holds the CoAP block context, payload buffer, status code, socket, and a one-element poll-fd array fds[1]. Access to ctx was not serialized, and prepare_fds() wrote ctx.fds[ctx.nfds] and incremented ctx.nfds with no bounds check. Two independent paths mutate ctx concurrently: the background autohandler running on the system workqueue, and user-triggered operations reached through the updatehub run shell command, direct API calls, or since the operations are exposed as syscalls userspace threads. When a second flow enters prepare_fds() while ctx.nfds is already 1, the write lands one element past the array; by struct layout it overlaps the adjacent ctx.sock/ctx.nfds members. More broadly, the unsynchronized sharing lets two flows interleave connection setup and teardown, double-closing a socket descriptor or scribbling the shared buffers. The result is corruption of the update subsystem's internal state and denial of service of the firmware-update path; the out-of-bounds write is contained within the ctx structure and there is no demonstrated path to memory outside it or to code execution. Triggering requires a local actor able to invoke update operations (or, with CONFIG_USERSPACE, an unprivileged userspace thread) and to win a timing race against the background handler; remote peers cannot control the race timing. The fix serializes the entry points with a mutex and adds a bounds check to prepare_fds().

Race Condition

Zephyr OTA CoAP/DTLS Socket Descriptor Leak Allows DoS
CVE-2026-11811 3.7 - Low - August 10, 2026

The UpdateHub over-the-air update client's start_coap_client() in subsys/mgmt/updatehub/updatehub.c leaks the CoAP/DTLS socket descriptor on its connection-setup failure paths. The shared error: cleanup gated socket closing on a ret > 0 flag, but ret was set to -1 immediately after the socket was created, so when zsock_setsockopt() (DTLS) or zsock_connect() subsequently failed the gate was false and cleanup_connection() was never called. The open descriptor in the global ctx.sock was then overwritten by the next attempt, permanently leaking it from the socket / net_context pool until reboot. The failing setup path is reached every time the OTA client tries to contact the UpdateHub server and the connection cannot be established driven automatically by the periodic autohandler() poll (and on demand via the updatehub_probe()/updatehub_update() API or the updatehub run shell command). The DTLS handshake/connect outcome is influenceable by a network or on-path attacker who drops, resets, or otherwise disrupts traffic to the server, and also fails naturally whenever the server is unreachable. Each failed attempt permanently leaks one descriptor; once the shared socket pool is exhausted, networking degrades device-wide until the device is rebooted, a denial-of-service condition. Severity is low because the leak rate is bounded by the configured OTA poll interval (default once per 24 hours), the effect is gradual and recovered by reboot, and only builds with the UpdateHub client enabled are affected. There is no memory-corruption, information-disclosure, or authentication impact.

Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime

Zephyr 3.5 TLS DTLS CID Buffer Overflow via getsockopt
CVE-2026-8718 8.4 - High - August 10, 2026

tls_opt_dtls_peer_connection_id_value_get() in subsys/net/lib/sockets/sockets_tls.c, which handles getsockopt(SOL_TLS, TLS_DTLS_PEER_CID_VALUE), passed the caller-supplied optval directly to mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid() without verifying the buffer was at least MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX (default 32) bytes. mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid() copies the peer-negotiated DTLS Connection ID (length 1..MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) into that buffer without a destination-size parameter, so a caller-supplied optlen smaller than the CID causes a write of up to 31 bytes past the buffer end. In CONFIG_USERSPACE builds the getsockopt syscall verifier (z_vrfy_zsock_getsockopt) bounce-buffers the user's optval into a kernel allocation of exactly optlen bytes (k_usermode_alloc_from_copy -> z_thread_malloc), so an unprivileged user thread that passes a small optlen on a connected DTLS socket with Connection ID enabled induces a kernel-heap buffer overflow, with the overflowing content being the remote peer's CID. The defect requires CONFIG_MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID, an established DTLS session with a negotiated peer CID, and (for the kernel-crossing case) CONFIG_USERSPACE. Introduced when the TLS_DTLS_CID option was added (v3.5.0). The fix rejects callers whose optlen is below MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX with -EINVAL.

Memory Corruption

Zephyr UpdateHub OTA Client: Uninitialized-Read Causes OOB Crash
CVE-2026-11809 3.7 - Low - August 10, 2026

The UpdateHub OTA client in subsys/mgmt/updatehub/updatehub.c contains an out-of-bounds / uninitialized-memory read in z_impl_updatehub_probe(). The probe response from the UpdateHub server is copied into a heap buffer (metadata) that is correctly NUL-terminated, but a second buffer (metadata_copy) is allocated with k_malloc (unzeroed) and filled with memcpy(metadata_copy, metadata, strlen(metadata)), which omits the terminating NUL. Everything after the copied content remains uninitialized heap. When the first json_obj_parse() over the array descriptor fails, the code falls back to json_obj_parse(metadata_copy, strlen(metadata_copy), ...). The strlen() call scans past the copied bytes through uninitialized heap and, if no zero byte is found before the end of the allocation, reads beyond the buffer; the resulting over-long length is then parsed as JSON. The probe payload is fully controlled by the (malicious, compromised, or without the optional CONFIG_UPDATEHUB_DTLS on-path) UpdateHub server, which can craft a large payload that fails the first parse to drive this path. The consequence is a read of uninitialized heap, with a worst case of an out-of-bounds read past the metadata_copy allocation that can fault and crash the update thread/device, producing a network-triggerable denial of service. The over-read data is consumed only internally to evaluate the update and is not returned to the attacker, so there is no direct information disclosure and no out-of-bounds write. The fix zeroes metadata_copy with memset before the copy, guaranteeing NUL termination and bounding strlen() within the allocation.

Out-of-bounds Read

Zephyr UpdateHub Agent Null Ptr CPU Fault DoS
CVE-2026-11810 7.5 - High - August 10, 2026

The UpdateHub firmware-update agent's probe handler (z_impl_updatehub_probe() in subsys/mgmt/updatehub/updatehub.c) parses the JSON metadata returned by the update server into a fixed two-level nested-array struct. After parsing it validates only the outer array length (objects_len != 2) and then dereferences objects[1].objects[0].objects.sha256sum via strlen() without checking that the inner object array of element [1] is non-empty. The metadata is attacker-influenceable network input: the agent fetches it over CoAP from the configured UpdateHub server during its routine OTA probe. A malicious or compromised update server (or, when DTLS is disabled, a network man-in-the-middle) can return a response whose second outer object array is empty. Because the parse target is zero-initialised, the corresponding objects[1].objects[0].objects.sha256sum pointer is NULL, and the subsequent strlen() dereferences address zero. The same defect exists in both the 'any boards' and 'some boards' metadata layouts. The resulting CPU fault is fatal under Zephyr's default error handling, halting or resetting the device, so the flaw is a remotely triggerable denial of service. Impact is limited to availability; it is a read from NULL with no out-of-bounds write, memory corruption, or information disclosure. The fix rejects metadata whose inner object array is empty before any dereference, on both layouts.

NULL Pointer Dereference

Zephyr SF32LB QSPI NOR flash negative offset read/write flaw
CVE-2026-11743 6.6 - Medium - August 07, 2026

The SF32LB MPI QSPI NOR flash driver (drivers/flash/flash_sf32lb_mpi_qspi_nor.c) validated the flash offset and length on its read and write paths with the test (offset + size) > data->size. Because offset is a signed off_t while size is unsigned, a negative offset is converted to a large unsigned value and the addition can wrap to a small result that passes the check. The read path then performs memcpy(dst, (void *)(data->base + offset), size) and the write path programs flash at offset and cache-invalidates data->base + offset, in both cases accessing memory outside the mapped flash window. The driver's erase path already rejected negative offsets, but read and write did not. In builds with CONFIG_USERSPACE, flash_read and flash_write are syscalls whose verifiers validate the device object and the caller's buffer but deliberately delegate offset bounds checking to the driver. An unprivileged thread that has been granted access to this flash device can therefore call the syscall with a crafted negative offset and a buffer valid in its own memory domain, and reach the unchecked access. The most direct impact is on the read path: by choosing a negative offset and matching size, an attacker slides the memcpy source below the flash base and copies arbitrary CPU-addressable memory into its own buffer, disclosing memory it is not authorized to read. The write path additionally allows programming flash at an out-of-range address and invalidating an attacker-chosen cache range, affecting integrity and availability. Reachability requires userspace to be enabled and the raw flash device object to be granted to an untrusted thread. The fix replaces the check with qspi_nor_range_is_valid(), which rejects negative offsets and performs the bound comparison in overflow-safe 64-bit arithmetic on both paths, and additionally adds an SRAM DMA bounce buffer plus source/destination overlap rejection to prevent a separate DMA bus-hang condition.

Out-of-bounds Read

Use-After-Free in Zephyr k_queue_peek_* on concurrent get
CVE-2026-11742 3.6 - Low - August 07, 2026

The kernel queue helper z_queue_node_peek() in kernel/queue.c dereferences a node taken from a queue's data_q list, reading the node's flag byte and, for items enqueued via k_queue_alloc_append/alloc_prepend, the data pointer of an internally allocated alloc_node struct. The implementations of z_impl_k_queue_peek_head() and z_impl_k_queue_peek_tail() performed this read-and-dereference without holding the queue's spinlock, while every other accessor of the same list including k_queue_get(), which unlinks a node and k_free()s its backing alloc_node operates under that lock. Because peek was unsynchronized, a concurrent k_queue_get() on the same queue (on an SMP build, or under preemption/ISR concurrency) can free the node between the moment peek obtains the node pointer and the moment it dereferences it. The peek then reads flag bits and a data pointer out of freed, potentially re-allocated heap memory and returns a stale or dangling pointer to its caller. k_fifo and k_lifo are thin wrappers over k_queue, so this affects buffer queues used throughout the net_buf, Bluetooth, USB, and networking subsystems; the peek operations are also system calls reachable from CONFIG_USERSPACE threads. The consequences are a use-after-free read that can leak stale heap contents (one pointer word) and, when the returned dangling pointer is subsequently consumed as a live buffer, a dereference that can crash the system or corrupt memory. Exploitation requires winning a small race window with local access (e.g. a userspace process racing k_queue_peek_* against k_queue_get on a shared queue, or two CPUs), so practical impact is bounded and of low severity. The fix wraps both peek implementations with k_spin_lock/k_spin_unlock on the queue lock, making the read-and-dereference atomic with respect to the concurrent unlink-and-free and bringing peek into line with the rest of the queue's locking discipline.

Dangling pointer

Zephyr Bluetooth ATT UAF Crash
CVE-2026-11368 7.1 - High - August 04, 2026

The Bluetooth host ATT layer (subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c) associates each in-flight ATT TX buffer with its owning channel via the static tx_meta_data_storage[] array (data->att_chan = chan). When a buffer's last reference is dropped, its net-buf destroy callback defers the completion handling to the system workqueue (att_tx_destroy -> att_tx_destroy_work_handler -> att_on_sent_cb -> bt_att_sent), where bt_att_sent dereferences the channel and its ATT context (sys_slist_get(&att->reqs)). When a peer disconnects while an ATT PDU (a server notification/indication or any response) is still in flight in the controller TX path, L2CAP tears the channel down in l2cap_chan_del(): it runs the disconnected callback and then the released callback (bt_att_released), which frees the channel slab slot. Because the in-flight buffer is held by the connection TX path rather than the channel's own queue, its deferred destroy work can run after the channel has been freed. The att_on_sent_cb guard intended to drop the stale callback itself dereferences meta->att_chan, which is now a dangling pointer into a freed (and possibly reused) slab slot. A remote peer with an ATT connection can drive this by disconnecting during routine ATT traffic; no pairing or user interaction is required to reach the ATT bearer. The result is a use-after-free read/write of freed channel memory, reliably crashing the Bluetooth host (denial of service) and, because the channel slab slot may be reused, potentially corrupting live memory. The fix makes bt_att_released() NULL the att_chan field of every tx_meta_data_storage[] entry still referencing the channel before freeing it, so the deferred guard observes a NULL pointer and drops the callback. Teardown and the destroy work both run on the cooperative system workqueue, so the array update is serialized and needs no lock.

Dangling pointer

Heap OOB Write in Zephyr v4.0 HawkBit Client: Response Body Buffer (CWE-122)
CVE-2026-10849 8.2 - High - August 03, 2026

The hawkBit device management client in subsys/mgmt/hawkbit accumulates the body of an HTTP response from the update server into a heap buffer in response_json_cb() (subsys/mgmt/hawkbit/hawkbit.c). The buffer is sized to hold the received body bytes but reserves no space for a terminating NUL. When the full response has arrived, the code writes response_data[downloaded_size] = '\0' and whenever the accumulated body length equals the allocation, that terminator lands one byte past the end of the heap object (a heap-based out-of-bounds write, CWE-122 / CWE-787). The body length and fragmentation are taken directly from the parsed HTTP response (rsp->body_frag_start / rsp->body_frag_len) and are fully controlled by the remote hawkBit server, which chooses its own response length. The precise trigger depends on how the buffer grows, and both forms are remotely reachable. Since v4.0.0 the reallocation is sized to exactly downloaded_size + body_len, so any response body larger than the 1100-byte initial buffer makes the out-of-bounds write deterministic; such response sizes are normal for hawkBit deployment metadata. Before v4.0.0 the buffer grew by doubling and the growth check ((downloaded_size + body_len) > response_buffer_size) is false at equality, so a response body whose length is exactly the current allocation 1100 bytes with the default initial buffer skips the reallocation entirely and writes the terminator at response_data[1100] of an 1100-byte object. The HTTP length-mismatch check does not catch this, because the declared and received lengths genuinely agree. Either form is reachable by a malicious, compromised, or man-in-the-middle update server (TLS is optional and, when enabled, does not protect against a hostile server), with no authentication of response content and no client-side length cap protecting the write. The out-of-bounds write is a fixed single NUL byte immediately following the allocation, corrupting adjacent allocator metadata or the next allocation. The practical impact is heap corruption leading to denial of service (fault on a subsequent allocation or free), with the bounded, allocator-dependent possibility of further corruption. The fix sizes the buffer to the body length plus one and copies with memcpy, ensuring the terminator always lands within the allocation.

Heap-based Buffer Overflow

Zephyr OCPP Client <4.5 DoS via Unbounded WAMP RPC Parsing
CVE-2026-10848 7 - High - August 02, 2026

The OCPP 1.6 client in subsys/net/lib/ocpp parsed inbound WAMP RPC frames in parse_rpc_msg() (subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c) using a hand-rolled helper, extract_string_field(), that copied the message's uid and action fields with strncpy(out_buf, token + 1, outlen - 1) and then scanned the result with strchr(out_buf, '"'). Because strncpy does not NUL-terminate the destination when the source is at least outlen - 1 (127) bytes long, the subsequent strchr reads past the 128-byte destination buffer into adjacent stack memory; if a " byte is found beyond the buffer, a one-byte out-of-bounds NUL write also occurs. A related defect in extract_payload() runs strchr/strrchr over the receive buffer, which may not be NUL-terminated when a maximal-length frame fills it. The parsed bytes come directly from the OCPP central-system server over a websocket: the reader thread fills recv_buf via websocket_recv_msg() and calls parse_rpc_msg() on each inbound DATA frame (subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c). A malicious or compromised central server, or an on-path attacker (OCPP is commonly deployed over plain ws://), can send an RPC frame whose uid or action field is 127+ bytes with no closing quote, triggering the out-of-bounds access. The primary impact is a remotely triggerable denial of service: the unbounded scan can fault on an unmapped page, and the stray NUL write can corrupt adjacent stack state. The over-read data is not reflected to the peer, so disclosure is limited. The feature is EXPERIMENTAL and must be explicitly enabled (CONFIG_OCPP). The fix replaces the manual parser with the bounds-respecting json_mixed_arr_parse() and copies the extracted uid with an explicitly NUL-terminated buffer, eliminating both over-reads.

Out-of-bounds Read

Zephyr BT Mesh Subkey Slot Leak (v4.5.0)
CVE-2026-10774 2.4 - Low - August 02, 2026

Zephyr's Bluetooth Mesh subnet key management leaks one PSA Crypto key slot on every subnet-key teardown. In subsys/bluetooth/mesh/subnet.c, net_keys_create() imports the Private Beacon Key into a PSA key slot under CONFIG_BT_MESH_PRIV_BEACONS (enabled by default), but subnet_keys_destroy() guarded the matching psa_destroy_key() with CONFIG_BT_MESH_V1d1. That Kconfig symbol was removed when explicit Mesh 1.0.1 support was dropped, so the destroy branch became permanently dead code and the import is never balanced by a destroy. The imbalanced teardown is reached every time subnet keys are destroyed: deleting a subnet (Config Server NetKey Delete), completing a Key Refresh Procedure (which retires the old key set), and resetting/re-provisioning the node. The over-the-air triggers are processed only under the node's device key, so they are exercisable by the provisioner or network administrator that owns the node, reachable over the Bluetooth Mesh network. With the default CONFIG_MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT of 16, repeated add/delete or key-refresh cycles exhaust the shared PSA key-slot pool after roughly a dozen rounds. Once exhausted, bt_mesh_private_beacon_key() and thus subnet creation fail: the node can no longer add subnets or complete key refresh, and other PSA crypto consumers on the device may be starved, until the device is rebooted. The fix aligns the destroy guard with the import guard (CONFIG_BT_MESH_PRIV_BEACONS) so each slot is freed.

Memory Leak

Zephyr DHCPv4 OOB Read Crash (before 4.5.0)
CVE-2026-10773 5.4 - Medium - August 01, 2026

The DHCPv4 client helper net_dhcpv4_msg_type_name() in subsys/net/lib/dhcpv4/dhcpv4.c indexes a static 8-element const char * name table after a faulty bounds check. The guard used msg_type <= sizeof(name) instead of msg_type <= ARRAY_SIZE(name); sizeof returns the byte size of the pointer array (32 on 32-bit, 64 on 64-bit targets) rather than the element count of 8, so message-type values from 9 up to that byte size pass the check and cause name[msg_type - 1] to read past the end of the array. The msg_type value originates from the DHCP MESSAGE TYPE option, which is read as an unchecked raw byte from a received packet (net_pkt_read_u8) and passed unmodified into the lookup. A DHCP server, or any host able to inject a spoofed DHCP reply onto the client's link, can therefore drive the index out of bounds. The out-of-range slot yields a garbage const char * that is then dereferenced by a %s log conversion. The lookup is reached only from a debug log statement (NET_DBG / LOG_DBG), so the out-of-bounds read is triggerable only when the DHCPv4 log module is built at DEBUG level (CONFIG_NET_DHCPV4_LOG_LEVEL_DBG), which is not the default configuration. When that condition holds, the result is an out-of-bounds read and a wild-pointer dereference: most likely a crash of the DHCP client (denial of service) and potentially disclosure of an adjacent pointer's contents through the log output. The fix replaces sizeof with ARRAY_SIZE, restoring the correct 1..8 acceptance window.

Out-of-bounds Read

Zephyr 2.6.0-<4.5.0 Bluetooth GATT Permission Bypass
CVE-2026-2411 6.5 - Medium - August 01, 2026

Zephyr's Bluetooth host declares a GATT characteristic as two consecutive attributes: a Characteristic Declaration whose permission is hard-coded to BT_GATT_PERM_READ, and a Characteristic Value attribute that carries the application-specified security permissions (e.g. BT_GATT_PERM_READ_ENCRYPT / READ_AUTHEN / READ_LESC). The public notify and indicate APIs explicitly accept either attribute, and passing the declaration is the documented, common idiom. Before sending each notification or indication, the host re-checks link security with bt_gatt_check_perm() against params->attr in gatt_notify(), gatt_indicate(), and gatt_notify_multiple_verify_params() (subsys/bluetooth/host/gatt.c). When the application passed the Characteristic Declaration attribute, the host correctly redirected the value handle but left params->attr pointing at the declaration, so the security check evaluated the declaration's permissions (no security required) instead of the value's. As a result the encryption/authentication/LESC requirement configured on the characteristic value was skipped. The Notify-Multiple path additionally used a mask that omitted the LE Secure Connections requirement. A remote peer triggers the disclosure by connecting (optionally without pairing or encryption) and writing the Client Characteristic Configuration descriptor to enable notifications or indications, causing the server to emit the protected value over a link that has not reached the required security level. The impact is information disclosure / access-control bypass for characteristic values the application intended to expose only over a secured link; exposure depends on the application declaring encrypt/authen-required notify/indicate characteristics and on the CCC being writable at a lower security tier. There is no memory-safety or availability impact. The fix adds bt_gatt_attr_resolve_value(), which maps a declaration attribute to the following value attribute before the permission check, and switches the Notify-Multiple path to the full BT_GATT_PERM_READ_ENCRYPT_MASK so the LESC requirement is also enforced.

AuthZ

Zephyr IPv6 hoplimit not decremented in routing v1.8v4.4.1
CVE-2026-10686 5.8 - Medium - July 31, 2026

Zephyr's IPv6 forwarding path re-sent routed unicast packets without ever decrementing the IPv6 hop limit. Both routing branches of ipv6_route_packet() (subsys/net/ip) were affected: the explicit-route path (net_route_packet()) and the on-link cross-interface path (net_route_packet_if()). Each set the packet forwarding flag and called net_send_data() with the hop limit untouched and no expiry check. Per RFC 8200 the hop-limit decrement is the mechanism that bounds packet lifetime and terminates routing loops; without it, a device acting as an IPv6 router relays looping packets indefinitely. An on-path attacker who can induce or exploit a transient L3 loop turns it into a permanent forwarding storm, causing CPU/bandwidth resource exhaustion (availability DoS) on the forwarder and adjacent links; path-discovery and loop diagnostics that rely on hop-limit expiry are also defeated. Affected configurations. In every affected release the forwarding path is reached via CONFIG_NET_ROUTE (enabled by default when CONFIG_NET_IPV6_NBR_CACHE is set), together with CONFIG_NET_ROUTING for cross-interface routing. Note that CONFIG_NET_IPV6_FORWARDING and CONFIG_NET_IPV4_FORWARDING which appear in the fix and in this advisory's evidence notes were introduced after v4.4.0, when the routing options were split and renamed; they do not exist in any affected release. When auditing a v4.4.1-or-earlier configuration, look for CONFIG_NET_ROUTE and CONFIG_NET_ROUTING. IPv4 is not affected in any release. The IPv4 forwarding path (net_route_ipv4_packet() in route_ipv4.c) was added after v4.4.0 and has never shipped in a release. Its TTL decrement and IPv4 header-checksum recomputation landed on main as part of the same fix, so the evidence notes below discuss it, but no released version is reachable by way of IPv4. Affected releases are v1.8.0 through v4.4.1: v1.8.0 introduced net_route_packet() and v2.2.0 added net_route_packet_if(), and neither decremented the hop limit. v4.3.1 carries the explicit-route fix but not the on-link one, so it is affected as well. Fixed on main by 7d8f1afa7345 (explicit-route path) and 589eadc74efa (on-link path).

Infinite Loop

Zephyr OS GATT Client UAF via CCCwrite response handler
CVE-2026-10685 7.6 - High - July 31, 2026

The Zephyr Bluetooth GATT client CCC-write response handler gatt_write_ccc_rsp() in subsys/bluetooth/host/gatt.c invoked the application's params->subscribe() callback after it had already called params->notify(conn, params, NULL, 0). Per the public GATT API, a notify callback with NULL data is the documented signal that the subscription has terminated and the bt_gatt_subscribe_params struct may be freed or reused by the application; calling subscribe() on the struct afterwards is a use-after-free, including an indirect call through the freed params->subscribe function pointer. The error branch is remotely (adjacent) reachable: a Zephyr device acting as a GATT client that calls bt_gatt_subscribe() can be driven into this ordering when a connected GATT server peer answers the CCC write with an ATT Error Response (the peer-supplied error code flows through att_error_rsp -> att_handle_rsp into gatt_write_ccc_rsp). For applications that free or recycle subscription parameters in their notification-termination handler, this results in memory corruption, a crash (denial of service), or potentially attacker-influenced control flow. The fix reorders the handler so the subscribe() callback runs before the terminating notify(NULL) in both the error and unsubscribe paths.

Dangling pointer

Zephyr v4.24.4 coredump_shell OOB read disclosure via shell
CVE-2026-10684 3 - Low - July 29, 2026

In subsys/debug/coredump/coredump_shell.c, print_coredump_hdr() used the 16-bit tgt_code field of a stored Zephyr coredump header directly as an index into coredump_target_code2str[], a fixed 7-element array of string pointers, with no bounds check. A stored coredump whose tgt_code is >= 7 causes an out-of-bounds read of a char* up to ~64K entries past the array; that value is passed as the %s argument to shell_print, which dereferences and walks it as a string. The result is either disclosure of device memory contents to the shell user or a crash when the out-of-bounds pointer is unmapped. The defect is reached via the coredump print shell command (cmd_coredump_print_stored_dump -> pretty_print_coredump -> parse_and_print_coredump -> print_coredump_hdr). The tgt_code field is device-generated and in-range during normal crash handling, so triggering requires local shell access plus the ability to stage or corrupt the stored coredump in the flash/in-memory backend. Introduced in v4.2.0 (commit 13abd7fe730) and present through v4.4.0; fixed by clamping out-of-range codes to the 'unknown' (index 0) entry.

Out-of-bounds Read

DoS in Synopsys DesignWare I2C Driver via Lost STOP Interrupt
CVE-2026-10683 2.4 - Low - July 27, 2026

In the Synopsys DesignWare I2C driver (drivers/i2c/i2c_dw.c) operating in target/slave mode, the rx_full interrupt handler gates the write_requested() callback on dw->state != CMD_SEND, and dw->state is only reset to READY on a STOP interrupt. The START_DET interrupt, whose handler in i2c_dw_slave_read_clear_intr_bits() would reset the state on every (re)START, was never added to the enabled interrupt mask in i2c_dw_slave_register(), so that recovery path was dead code. As a result, if the STOP interrupt is lost (bus glitch/reset, or a concurrent master driving STOP) or the bus master issues a legal WRITE-repeated-START-WRITE sequence with the same direction, the driver remains in CMD_SEND permanently and never invokes write_requested() again for the life of the target. An I2C master on the same physical bus can deliberately trigger this, causing the I2C target function to malfunction for all subsequent write transactions and desynchronizing consumer framing state (e.g. MCTP-over-I2C), a recoverable-by-reset denial of service of the target peripheral. The fix unmasks START_DET so the state is reset at every bus (re)START. Impact is availability-only over a local board-level bus; no memory corruption results in the in-tree consumer, whose per-byte buffer write is independently bounds-checked.

Infinite Loop

Zephyr OS OOB write via log_filter_set syscall (v3.3 - v4.4)
CVE-2026-10682 6.6 - Medium - July 27, 2026

The userspace verifier z_vrfy_log_filter_set() for the log_filter_set syscall in subsys/logging/log_mgmt.c performed a signed comparison against the int16_t src_id parameter: src_id < (int16_t)log_src_cnt_get(domain_id). Any negative value for src_id (e.g. -1) trivially satisfied this check and was forwarded into z_impl_log_filter_set, where it propagated to filter_set() and ultimately to get_dynamic_filter(), which uses source_id as an unsigned index into the linker-section array &TYPE_SECTION_START(log_dynamic)[source_id].filters. After implicit conversion through uint32_t, an int16_t -1 becomes 0xFFFFFFFF, indexing log_dynamic far out of bounds and causing the kernel to perform an OOB read and an OOB read-modify-write (LOG_FILTER_SLOT_GET/SET) against memory adjacent to the log_dynamic section. The written value is a constrained 3-bit log level slot within the targeted 32-bit word, but the target address is attacker-chosen (a small negative offset from log_dynamic) and the write occurs in supervisor mode following a syscall from an unprivileged user thread, providing a kernel memory-corruption / privilege-escalation primitive. The defect is reachable on any build with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y and CONFIG_LOG_RUNTIME_FILTERING=y. Present from Zephyr v3.3.0 through v4.4.1. The fix replaces the signed bound check with an unsigned comparison: (uint32_t)src_id < log_src_cnt_get(domain_id), which correctly rejects negative inputs.

Memory Corruption

Zephyr 4.4.0 Userspace Dynamic-Objects Race: Duplicate Thread ID & ACL Leak
CVE-2026-10681 6.5 - Medium - July 25, 2026

In Zephyr's userspace dynamic-objects subsystem, thread_idx_alloc() in kernel/userspace/userspace.c allocated a new thread permission index from the global _thread_idx_map[] bitmap without holding lists_lock. On SMP systems, two user-mode threads invoking the k_object_alloc(K_OBJ_THREAD) syscall concurrently can both observe the same low free bit, perform the same non-atomic RMW to clear it, and return the identical tidx. The two newly created K_OBJ_THREAD objects are then assigned the same thread_id, so the two user threads alias a single bit position in every kernel object's perms[] bitfield: any subsequent grant of access on a kernel object to one thread is implicitly a grant to the other, defeating userspace ACL isolation. A secondary lost-update window between the unlocked &=~BIT() in alloc and the locked |= BIT() in thread_idx_free() can also leak entries from the thread-index pool. The defect is reachable from any user-mode thread via the unrestricted __syscall k_object_alloc and is gated on CONFIG_USERSPACE, CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS, and CONFIG_SMP. The flaw was introduced when the per-thread permission index was added in 2018 and is present in every release up to and including v4.4.0. Fixed by holding lists_lock across the bitmap RMW and the permissions clear (and inlining the obj_list traversal that previously took the lock itself).

Race Condition

Zephyr ext2 FS Integer Division by Zero during Mount
CVE-2026-7007 4.6 - Medium - July 24, 2026

The Zephyr ext2 file system validates the on-disk superblock in ext2_verify_disk_superblock() (subsys/fs/ext2/ext2_impl.c) before completing a mount. The validator checked the magic number, block size, revision and feature flags, but did not verify that the on-disk fields s_blocks_per_group and s_inodes_per_group are non-zero. Both fields are read directly from the image and are later used as divisors during mount-time initialization. During mount, get_ngroups() divides and modulos s_blocks_count by s_blocks_per_group (reached via ext2_fetch_block_group() from ext2_init_fs()), and get_itable_entry() divides (ino - 1) by s_inodes_per_group when fetching the root inode (both in subsys/fs/ext2/ext2_diskops.c). A superblock with either field set to zero therefore causes an integer division by zero during the mount sequence. An attacker who can present a crafted ext2 image to a device that mounts ext2 removable media such as an SD card or a USB mass-storage device can trigger this. On ARMv7-M / ARMv8-M-mainline Cortex-M targets, divide-by-zero trapping is enabled (SCB_CCR_DIV_0_TRP), so the division raises a UsageFault that Zephyr treats as a fatal error, producing a denial of service. The impact is limited to availability; the malformed value is consumed only as a divisor. The fix rejects a zero s_blocks_per_group or s_inodes_per_group in the superblock validator, returning -EINVAL so the mount fails before any block-group or inode I/O occurs.

Divide By Zero

Zephyr Bluetooth BR/EDR L2CAP OoB Read/Write in classic/l2cap_br.c (v4.4)
CVE-2026-10680 7.6 - High - July 21, 2026

The Classic (BR/EDR) L2CAP signaling handlers l2cap_br_conf_req() and l2cap_br_conf_rsp() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/l2cap_br.c validated the minimum command size against buf->len (the bytes remaining in the whole received PDU) instead of len (the per-command data length from the L2CAP signaling header). Because multiple signaling commands can be packed into one PDU, buf->len may exceed a command's len. An attacker can send a CONF_REQ command with a header length smaller than the configuration-request structure (e.g. 0), followed by another command so that buf->len still satisfies the check. The check then passes incorrectly and opt_len = len - sizeof(*req) underflows the uint16_t to a near-0xFFFF value. The configuration-option loop, which lacks an opt_len-versus-buf->len guard, then walks far past the end of the pooled ACL receive buffer using net_buf pull primitives that perform no runtime bounds check, producing an out-of-bounds read of host memory and, when the out-of-bounds option bytes encode an MTU or flush-timeout option, an out-of-bounds write. The BR/EDR signaling channel is processed before pairing/encryption and an L2CAP channel to an L0 service such as SDP can be opened without pairing, so an unauthenticated peer within radio range that can establish an ACL connection can trigger the flaw, leading to memory corruption and denial of service (host/device crash). The defect is present in released versions including v4.4.0. The fix validates against len instead of buf->len in both handlers.

Out-of-bounds Read

Zephyr V4.4.0 DesignWare SPI Divide-by-Zero DoS
CVE-2026-10679 3.3 - Low - July 21, 2026

The DesignWare SPI driver (drivers/spi/spi_dw.c) computed the SPI BAUDR clock divider as info->clock_frequency / config->frequency without validating config->frequency. spi_transceive is a Zephyr __syscall and its verify handler (drivers/spi/spi_handlers.c) copies the caller-supplied spi_config from userspace without checking the frequency field, so a userspace thread that has been granted access to a DesignWare SPI device kernel object can pass frequency = 0 and trigger an unsigned integer divide-by-zero in spi_dw_configure(). On Cortex-M Mainline (SCB->CCR.DIV_0_TRP is set in z_arm_fault_init()) and on ARC (a dedicated __ev_div_zero vector) this raises a CPU exception, resulting in a kernel fault and local denial of service. The fix rejects zero frequency and frequencies above clock_frequency / 2 (the DesignWare SSI databook minimum SCKDIV of 2) with -EINVAL. The defect affects all Zephyr releases up to and including v4.4.0; exploitation requires CONFIG_USERSPACE=y and an unprivileged thread already granted SPI driver permission. There is no memory-corruption or information-disclosure impact.

Divide By Zero

Zephyr MCTP-I2C+GPIO Null Deref & 1byte Heap Overflow (v4.34.4)
CVE-2026-10678 8.1 - High - July 21, 2026

The MCTP-over-I2C+GPIO target binding in Zephyr (subsys/pmci/mctp/mctp_i2c_gpio_target.c) processes pseudo-register writes from an I2C bus master byte-by-byte in mctp_i2c_gpio_target_write_received() without validating the order or the receive buffer. In the affected versions the MCTP_I2C_GPIO_RX_MSG_ADDR (data) handler dereferences and writes through b->rx_pkt without checking that the receive buffer was allocated: a controller that selects the data register and writes a byte without first sending the length register (which is what allocates the buffer) causes a write of an attacker-chosen byte through a NULL/unallocated mctp_pktbuf pointer (i.e. into a small attacker-advanceable offset above address 0), producing memory corruption or a hard fault. The same handler also performs a write-then-check bounds test, allowing a one-byte heap overflow at data[255] when more than 255 data bytes are sent. Because the I2C target callback is invoked with raw bytes supplied by whatever device is the bus master and the binding performs no authentication, a malicious or malfunctioning controller on the bus can trigger these without any prior protocol state, leading to memory corruption and/or denial of service on the target device. The vulnerable code was introduced when the I2C+GPIO target binding was added and shipped in Zephyr v4.3.0 and v4.4.0. The fix defers allocation to the first data byte with a NULL check, treats a missing length as a zero-sized packet rejected by libmctp, and moves the bounds check before the store.

NULL Pointer Dereference

Zephyr Kernel k_poll event leak & DoS via CONFIG_USERSPACE until v4.4.1
CVE-2026-10677 6.5 - Medium - July 21, 2026

The CONFIG_USERSPACE syscall verifier z_vrfy_k_poll() in kernel/poll.c allocates a kernel-side copy of the user-supplied k_poll_event[] via z_thread_malloc() and then validates each event's object handle. Before this fix, validation used K_OOPS(K_SYSCALL_OBJ(...)) inline inside the loop, which kills the calling thread without freeing events_copy. A user thread can pass num_events >= 1 with a forged object handle to leak the allocation; because newly spawned user threads inherit the parent's resource_pool (kernel/thread.c), an attacker spawns sacrificial threads to repeat the leak until the shared kernel heap is exhausted. Once depleted, legitimate kernel allocations from that pool (k_queue alloc nodes, k_msgq buffers, future k_poll calls, etc.) fail, causing a system-level denial of service. The fix replaces each inline K_OOPS with a conditional goto oops_free so the buffer is freed before the thread is killed. Affects Zephyr releases from v1.12.0 (when k_poll was first exposed to user mode) through v4.4.1.

Memory Leak

Zephyr PB-ADV: Unauth Provisioning DoS via Timer Reschedule (v4.4.1)
CVE-2026-10675 4.3 - Medium - July 21, 2026

In Zephyr's Bluetooth Mesh PB-ADV provisioning bearer (subsys/bluetooth/mesh/pb_adv.c), prov_msg_recv() rescheduled the provisioning protocol watchdog timer unconditionally at the top of the function, before the FCS check and before the ADV_LINK_INVALID check. Once a provisioning attempt fails, prov_failed() sets ADV_LINK_INVALID and the only recovery path is the protocol timer firing (protocol_timeout -> prov_link_close -> close_link -> reset_adv_link and re-enabling of scanning and the unprovisioned device beacon). A remote, unauthenticated attacker on the BLE advertising channel can first induce a provisioning failure (e.g. with a malformed generic-provisioning PDU) and then transmit any FCS-valid PB-ADV transaction PDU on the same link ID more often than once per protocol timeout (60 s, or 120 s for OOB input/output). Because each such packet reset the timer even on an invalidated link, protocol_timeout never fired, the dead link was never torn down, and the device remained pinned in an un-provisionable state with its unprovisioned beacon disabled and new Link Open requests rejected. PB-ADV PDUs are processed without authentication and the FCS is a keyless CRC, so no pairing or prior trust is required and the attacker chooses the link ID itself. The impact is a persistent denial of provisioning/re-provisioning service; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality, or integrity impact. The vulnerable code shipped in releases through v4.4.1. The fix moves the timer reschedule to after the ADV_LINK_INVALID check (and the FCS check before the reset) so an invalidated link can no longer be kept alive by incoming packets.

Resource Exhaustion

NXP LPUART Clock Disable DoS in Zephyr <2.5.0
CVE-2026-10674 5.5 - Medium - July 21, 2026

The NXP LPUART serial driver (drivers/serial/uart_mcux_lpuart.c), when CONFIG_UART_USE_RUNTIME_CONFIGURE is enabled, called LPUART_Deinit() at the start of mcux_lpuart_configure(), which disables the LPUART peripheral clocks. The requested configuration is validated only afterwards (in mcux_lpuart_configure_basic), and unsupported parity/data-bit/stop-bit/flow-control values return -ENOTSUP before the clock is re-enabled. As a result, a uart_configure() request with an unsupported configuration left the LPUART in a clock-disabled state; any subsequent access to LPUART registers (poll_out/poll_in, interrupt handling, or a later reconfigure) faults on the gated peripheral and escalates to a hard fault, crashing the system. uart_configure() is a Zephyr syscall whose verifier (z_vrfy_uart_configure) only checks that cfg is readable user memory and forwards the caller-supplied configuration unchanged, so an unprivileged userspace thread with access to an LPUART device can deterministically trigger the fault, a persistent system-wide denial of service. Introduced in v2.5.0 and present in all subsequent releases until this fix, which removes the LPUART_Deinit() call and instead only disables the transmitter/receiver, leaving the clock running.

assertion failure

Zephyr ADIN2111 Driver OOB Write (OA SPI) v3.7v4.4
CVE-2026-10673 8.3 - High - July 15, 2026

The Zephyr ADIN2111/ADIN1110 10BASE-T1S/T1L Ethernet driver (drivers/ethernet/eth_adin2111.c) reassembles received Ethernet frames in OPEN Alliance (OA) SPI mode by copying device-supplied 64-byte data chunks into a fixed static buffer ctx->buf of size CONFIG_ETH_ADIN2111_BUFFER_SIZE (default 1524 bytes). In eth_adin2111_oa_data_read(), each valid chunk was memcpy'd into ctx->buf[ctx->scur] and the write cursor scur advanced, with no check that scur + len stayed within the buffer. The number of chunks (up to 255, from the BUFSTS RCA field) and the per-chunk length are taken entirely from the frame data received off the wire; the cursor is only reset on a start-of-frame chunk. An attacker on the single-pair Ethernet segment can therefore send a frame whose reassembled size exceeds the configured buffer, causing the driver's RX offload thread to write attacker-controlled frame bytes past the end of the static buffer into adjacent driver/kernel memory (up to roughly 14.8 KB in the worst case). This is a remotely/adjacently reachable out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) that can corrupt memory and cause denial of service or potentially code execution. The defect was introduced when OA SPI support was added (commit 0ca8b0756b1) and shipped in releases v3.7.0 through v4.4.0. The fix adds a bounds check that drops the oversized frame and resets the cursor before the copy.

Memory Corruption

Zephyr Kernel Pipe Reinit Flaw CVE-2026-10671 (v4.1-4.4, waitq corruption)
CVE-2026-10671 7.1 - High - July 14, 2026

In Zephyr's kernel pipe implementation, the userspace syscall verifier z_vrfy_k_pipe_init() in kernel/pipe.c used K_SYSCALL_OBJ() (which requires the kernel object to already be initialized) instead of K_SYSCALL_OBJ_NEVER_INIT() (which rejects an already-initialized object). As a result, on CONFIG_USERSPACE builds an unprivileged user thread that has been granted access to a k_pipe object can invoke the k_pipe_init syscall to re-initialize a pipe that is already in use. z_impl_k_pipe_init() unconditionally resets the ring buffer, sets pipe->waiting to 0, and re-initializes both wait queues (z_waitq_init on pipe->data and pipe->space) without waking or accounting for threads currently blocked on the pipe. Any thread already pended in k_pipe_read()/k_pipe_write() is left orphaned: still marked pending with pended_on pointing at the cleared wait queue and with stale qnode_dlist links into the (now re-initialized) embedded list head. When such an orphaned waiter is later timed out or woken, the scheduler calls sys_dlist_remove() on its stale node, writing through dangling prev/next pointers into kernel wait-queue/scheduler structures, causing list corruption (an attacker-driven invalid kernel write), lost wakeups, indefinitely blocked threads, and silent data loss. The flaw lets a deprivileged user thread corrupt the state of a kernel object shared with other threads/partitions. The fix switches the verifier to K_SYSCALL_OBJ_NEVER_INIT(), matching the existing k_msgq_init verifier, so a user thread can no longer re-initialize a live pipe. The vulnerable code shipped in v4.1.0 and remained through v4.4.0.

Dangling pointer

Zephyr LwM2M Firmware-Update URI Buffer Overflow v3.0.0-4.4.0 CVE-2026-10672
CVE-2026-10672 8.2 - High - July 14, 2026

subsys/net/lib/lwm2m/lwm2m_pull_context.c copied the firmware-update Package URI into a fixed static buffer (context.uri, size CONFIG_LWM2M_SWMGMT_PACKAGE_URI_LEN, default 128) with memcpy(context.uri, uri, LWM2M_PACKAGE_URI_LEN), copying exactly the destination size with no length validation. The Firmware-Update object stores the server-supplied Package URI (/5/0/1) in a 255-byte buffer, so a LwM2M management server (or an on-path attacker on a session lacking strong DTLS) can WRITE a URI of 128-254 characters; only the first 128 bytes are then copied into context.uri with no NUL terminator. That buffer is subsequently consumed as a C string by http_parser_parse_url(context.uri, strlen(context.uri), ...), strlen-based CoAP URI-path/PROXY-URI option appends, and lwm2m_parse_peerinfo(), causing an out-of-bounds read of adjacent static memory. The over-read bytes are appended to outbound CoAP requests (information disclosure of adjacent device memory to the server/proxy) and can crash the device (denial of service). The vulnerable copy was introduced by the pull-context refactor (first released in v3.0.0) and is present through v4.4.0; the default-on CONFIG_LWM2M_FIRMWARE_UPDATE_PULL_SUPPORT path is affected. The fix adds a strlen(uri) >= sizeof(context.uri) check returning -ENOMEM and switches to strcpy(), guaranteeing a bounded, NUL-terminated buffer.

Out-of-bounds Read

Zephyr Xtensa MPU: arch_buffer_validate BUF Overflow CVE-2026-10669 v3.7.0-4.4.0
CVE-2026-10669 7.8 - High - July 14, 2026

On Xtensa SoCs built with CONFIG_XTENSA_MPU and CONFIG_USERSPACE, arch_buffer_validate() in arch/xtensa/core/mpu.c the architecture hook that verifies a user-mode-supplied buffer is accessible to the calling user thread with the requested permission defaulted its return value to 0 (access permitted) and only set a denial result inside its per-MPU-region probe loop. When the rounded extent of the buffer wraps the 32-bit address space (size + alignment offset near SIZE_MAX, or ROUND_UP(size + offset) overflowing to 0), the loop executes zero iterations and the function returns 0 = permitted without probing any MPU region. The syscall-layer pre-checks (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_SIZE_CHECK / Z_DETECT_POINTER_OVERFLOW) only catch a raw addr+size wrap and do not cover the ROUND_UP-induced wrap, and the string path (arch_user_string_nlen -> arch_buffer_validate) has no syscall-layer guard at all. An unprivileged user-mode thread can therefore pass a crafted (addr, size) to any syscall that validates user buffers via k_usermode_from_copy/to_copy or k_usermode_string_copy and have validation succeed for memory it must not access; the kernel then reads from (disclosure) or, with write=1, writes to (corruption) attacker-chosen kernel or other-partition memory on the thread's behalf, enabling information disclosure, memory corruption, privilege escalation, and denial of service. Affected from v3.7.0 (when Xtensa MPU userspace support was added) through v4.4.0. The fix changes the default to -EINVAL (deny by default), adds an explicit size_add_overflow check, and sets the success value only after the full range has been validated.

Memory Corruption

Zephyr k_thread_name_copy NULL Deref via Unregistered Pointer (v4.4.0-)
CVE-2026-10670 5.5 - Medium - July 14, 2026

The CONFIG_USERSPACE verification handler for the k_thread_name_copy() system call (z_vrfy_k_thread_name_copy() in kernel/thread.c) calls k_object_find() on the caller-supplied thread pointer and then dereferences the returned struct k_object without checking it for NULL. k_object_find() returns NULL whenever the supplied pointer is not a registered (static or dynamic) kernel object. The pre-fix guard tested thread == NULL instead of ko == NULL, so an unprivileged user-mode thread that invokes k_thread_name_copy() with any non-NULL but unregistered pointer (e.g. an arbitrary address) passes the NULL test, after which the verifier reads ko->type through a NULL pointer. Because the syscall verifier runs in supervisor mode, this NULL dereference is a kernel-mode fault that halts or reboots the system, allowing untrusted user code to crash the kernel across the userspace security boundary (denial of service). The marshaller passes the thread argument to the verifier without any prior K_SYSCALL_OBJ validation, so the bad pointer reaches the defect directly. The flaw affects builds with CONFIG_USERSPACE and CONFIG_THREAD_NAME enabled and has been present since the special-case lookup was introduced around v2.0.0; it is present in v4.4.0 and earlier. The fix changes the guard to check the k_object_find() return value (ko == NULL) before dereferencing it.

NULL Pointer Dereference

Nuvoton NuMaker HSUSBD USB Control Endpoint DoS (pre-4.4.0)
CVE-2026-10668 2.4 - Low - July 12, 2026

The Nuvoton NuMaker HSUSBD USB device-controller driver (drivers/usb/udc/udc_numaker.c) armed the control Data IN stage unconditionally (base->CEPTXCNT = len in numaker_hsusbd_ep_trigger). Because the HSUSBD hardware cannot disarm a control Data IN already armed for a previous transfer, a USB host that cancels an in-flight control transfer (timeout) and then issues a new SETUP packet can drive the driver out of sync: stale data may be transmitted in the new transfer and the control endpoint can become permanently stuck NAK'ing every subsequent control transfer. A malicious or buggy host (physical/adjacent attacker driving the bus) can repeatedly cancel-and-re-SETUP to wedge the device's USB control endpoint, denying service to the device's USB function (the device stops enumerating/responding on the control pipe) until a USB reset or re-plug. The flaw is an availability-only denial of service; the FIFO copy loops (bounded by net_buf length and the hardware BUFFULL flag) and the net_buf lifecycle are independent of the arming desync, so there is no out-of-bounds access, use-after-free, or information leak. The fix monitors the IN-token and new-SETUP events (k_event) and only arms control Data IN when an IN token is present and no new SETUP has arrived, cancelling the current transfer on a new SETUP. Affects boards using the Nuvoton NuMaker HSUSBD controller (CONFIG_UDC_NUMAKER with DT_HAS_NUVOTON_NUMAKER_HSUSBD_ENABLED); shipped in v4.4.0.

Resource Exhaustion

Zephyr 1.144.4 UAF via obj_list race in SMP userspace
CVE-2026-10667 7.8 - High - July 12, 2026

Zephyr's dynamic kernel-object tracking (kernel/userspace/userspace.c, formerly kernel/userspace.c) maintains a doubly-linked list (obj_list) of dynamically allocated kernel objects. Iteration over this list in k_object_wordlist_foreach() was performed under lists_lock using the SAFE iterator (which caches the next node), but list removal and freeing of nodes was performed under different, disjoint spinlocks: objfree_lock in k_object_free() and obj_lock in unref_check(). On an SMP system, while one CPU iterated obj_list under lists_lock, another CPU could unlink and k_free() the dyn_obj node that the iterator had cached as its next pointer, causing the iterator to dereference freed kernel memory (use-after-free / dangling list traversal). All of the racing operations are reachable from unprivileged user-mode threads via system calls: k_object_alloc/k_object_alloc_size and k_object_release drive removals through unref_check() (under obj_lock), while k_thread_abort and thread creation drive the iteration through k_thread_perms_all_clear()/k_thread_perms_inherit() (under lists_lock). A deprivileged user thread on a CONFIG_SMP + CONFIG_USERSPACE build can therefore corrupt the kernel's object-tracking structures across the userspace security boundary, yielding kernel memory corruption (potential privilege escalation) or a kernel crash (denial of service). The fix removes objfree_lock and serializes every obj_list modification under lists_lock, including holding it across find+remove in k_object_free() and around unref_check() in k_thread_perms_clear(). Affects CONFIG_SMP+CONFIG_USERSPACE+CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS configurations; the defect dates to the 2019 spinlockification (commit 8a3d57b6cc6, first released in v1.14.0) and shipped through v4.4.0.

Dangling pointer

Zephyr OS <=v4.4 Unbounded Stack Copy in parse_ipv4()
CVE-2026-10666 8.1 - High - July 12, 2026

parse_ipv4() in subsys/net/ip/utils.c (reached via net_ipaddr_parse() for strings of the form "a.b.c.d:port") copies the port substring into a fixed 17-byte stack buffer (char ipaddr[NET_IPV4_ADDR_LEN + 1]) using a length of str_len - end - 1, where str_len is the full, unbounded input length and end is only the (<=15-byte) offset of the ':' delimiter. Because the destination size is never consulted, a crafted address string with a long suffix after the colon (e.g. "1.2.3.4:" followed by hundreds of bytes) causes an out-of-bounds stack write whose length and contents are fully attacker-controlled (memcpy of the suffix plus a trailing NUL), enabling memory corruption and at minimum a denial of service, and potentially control-flow hijack. The parser is reached from the standard socket API (zsock_getaddrinfo / literal-address resolution), DNS server-string configuration, and the eswifi Wi-Fi co-processor DNS-response path, so an application that resolves a network-influenced address string is exposed. The bug was introduced when the parser was added (Zephyr v1.9.0) and shipped in all releases through v4.4.0. The fix removes the unbounded copy and validates the port length before copying into a small dedicated buffer. Note: the equivalent IPv6 "[addr]:port" path in parse_ipv6() retains the same unbounded copy at this commit and remains a separate, still-reachable instance of the defect.

Stack Overflow

Zephyr 4.4.0 WireGuard: OOB Write via data_len in wg_process_data_message()
CVE-2026-10665 7.4 - High - July 12, 2026

In Zephyr's WireGuard subsystem (subsys/net/lib/wireguard), wg_process_data_message() in wg_crypto.c linearizes an inbound transport-data payload into a fixed pool buffer of CONFIG_WIREGUARD_BUF_LEN bytes before decryption. The call net_buf_linearize(buf->data, data_len, pkt->buffer, ..., data_len) passed the attacker-derived data_len as both the destination capacity and the copy length, defeating the function's internal len = min(len, dst_len) bound. data_len is derived from the received UDP datagram length and is only lower-bounded by wg_ctrl_recv() (no upper bound). When data_len exceeds CONFIG_WIREGUARD_BUF_LEN e.g. when the buffer length is lowered below the link MTU, on links with MTU above the buffer size, or via reassembled IPv4/IPv6 fragments that exceed it the underlying memcpy writes past the end of the pool buffer, an out-of-bounds write (CWE-787). The overflow occurs before the Poly1305 authentication check, so it requires only a valid receiver session index rather than a valid authenticator, and is reachable by a malicious or compromised peer (or an on-path attacker driving an established session) over the network, yielding remote memory corruption and at minimum a reliable denial of service. The defect was present in the WireGuard implementation shipped in Zephyr 4.4.0. The fix adds an explicit data_len > CONFIG_WIREGUARD_BUF_LEN rejection and corrects the linearize call to pass net_buf_max_len(buf) as the destination capacity.

Memory Corruption

nRF70 WiFi Driver OOB Write in nrf_wifi_event_proc() before Zephyr v4.4.0
CVE-2026-10664 5 - Medium - July 12, 2026

The nRF70 Wi-Fi driver's power-save event handler nrf_wifi_event_proc_get_power_save_info() in drivers/wifi/nrf_wifi/src/wifi_mgmt.c copied TWT (Target Wake Time) flow entries from an nrf_wifi_umac_event_power_save_info event into the fixed-size twt_flows[WIFI_MAX_TWT_FLOWS] (8-element) array of a caller-supplied struct wifi_ps_config, looping over event-provided num_twt_flows without validating it against WIFI_MAX_TWT_FLOWS or checking event_len. When num_twt_flows exceeds 8, the handler writes past the destination array (which is typically on the caller's stack, e.g. the wifi ps shell command) -- an out-of-bounds write of ~40-byte TWT entries -- and reads twt_flow_info[i] past the event buffer. The event is delivered by the nRF70 co-processor firmware in response to a host-initiated power-save GET, so reaching the overflow requires the firmware to emit a malformed or out-of-range event; the trust boundary is host-to-trusted-coprocessor rather than a direct remote-AP write, with over-the-air influence on the flow count being indirect and bounded by the 3-bit TWT flow-id space. Affected: builds with CONFIG_NRF70_STA_MODE on releases through v4.4.0. The fix rejects events with num_twt_flows > WIFI_MAX_TWT_FLOWS or with event_len shorter than the claimed entries, and adds a NULL check on the caller buffer.

Memory Corruption

Use-After-Free & Double-Free in Zephyr 4.4 USB Host Stack (CONFIG_USB_HOST_STACK)
CVE-2026-10663 6.1 - Medium - July 12, 2026

In Zephyr's experimental USB host stack (CONFIG_USB_HOST_STACK), usbh_device_disconnect() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c) freed the root usb_device slab object without clearing the cached pointer ctx->root. The bus removal handler dev_removed_handler() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_core.c) decides what to tear down solely from ctx->root, checking only that it is non-NULL. Because UHC controller drivers (e.g. uhc_max3421e, uhc_mcux_common) synthesize UHC_EVT_DEV_REMOVED directly from physical bus line state with no debounce or state guard, an attacker with physical USB access (or a rogue device that bounces its connection) can deliver a second device-removed event after a root device disconnect. The handler then re-enters usbh_device_disconnect() with the dangling pointer, locking a mutex inside the freed object (use-after-free), removing the freed node from the device list, and calling k_mem_slab_free() on the already-freed block (double-free). If the slab block has been reissued to a newly attached device in between, this corrupts a live object. Impact is denial of service (crash) and memory corruption; the attack vector is physical/local. The flaw was introduced in v4.4.0 by the connect/disconnect refactor and is fixed by clearing ctx->root in usbh_device_disconnect() before freeing.

Dangling pointer

Zephyr BAP Broadcast Assistant 4.x: Shared Buffer OOB Write
CVE-2026-10660 6.4 - Medium - July 11, 2026

The Bluetooth BAP Broadcast Assistant GATT client in subsys/bluetooth/audio/bap_broadcast_assistant.c reassembled remote Broadcast Receive State data into a single file-static net_buf_simple (att_buf, BT_ATT_MAX_ATTRIBUTE_LEN = 512 bytes) shared by all connection instances, while the BUSY flag, long-read handle, and reset/offset state were per-connection. When the device acts as a Broadcast Assistant connected to multiple Scan Delegator peripherals, notification and long-read callbacks from different connections interleave on the shared buffer: the append in notify_handler (net_buf_simple_add_mem at the not-busy branch) performs no tailroom check, so receive-state notifications from two or more delegators accumulate on the same 512-byte buffer and, with a sufficiently large configured ATT MTU (BT_L2CAP_TX_MTU up to 2000) and two-to-three concurrent connections, write past the buffer into adjacent .bss (net_buf_simple_add only asserts in debug builds). Even below the overflow threshold, one connection's net_buf_simple_reset zeroes the shared length while another connection's reassembly and GATT read offset are in flight, mixing one peer's data into another's parse. A malicious or compromised Scan Delegator (or two colluding peers) over BLE can trigger this, causing out-of-bounds writes (memory corruption / denial of service) and cross-connection data corruption. The fix moves the buffer into the per-connection instance struct so each connection reassembles into its own buffer. Affects Zephyr releases shipping the Broadcast Assistant with the shared buffer, including v4.4.0 and earlier.

Memory Corruption

Zephyr v4.4.0 FTL Flash Driver NULL Deref Causes Kernel Crash (Denial of Service)
CVE-2026-10659 4.7 - Medium - July 07, 2026

The Dhara flash translation layer disk driver (drivers/disk/ftl_dhara.c) implemented the dhara_nand_ callbacks so that, on a flash error, the error code was written unconditionally through the caller-supplied dhara_error_t err pointer (e.g. *err = DHARA_E_ECC in dhara_nand_read, and similar in dhara_nand_erase/prog/copy). The upstream Dhara library calls these callbacks with err == NULL along its journal-resume binary search: find_last_checkblock() invokes find_checkblock(j, mid, &found, NULL), which forwards the NULL pointer into dhara_nand_read(). This path runs during disk_ftl_access_init() -> dhara_map_resume() whenever the FTL disk is mounted/initialised. If a flash read error (uncorrectable ECC, bad block, controller error) occurs on one of the probed checkpoint pages, the driver dereferences and writes to NULL, faulting the kernel (denial of service). The trigger is conditioned on the NAND medium content/health, which can be influenced by media wear, induced faults, or a corrupted/crafted on-flash image. The fix routes all error assignments through the library's NULL-safe dhara_set_error() helper. Affects Zephyr v4.4.0, where the driver was introduced.

NULL Pointer Dereference

Zephyr OS DNS Resolver OOB Read via memcmp in getaddrinfo() ( 1.10.0)
CVE-2026-10657 3.7 - Low - July 05, 2026

Zephyr's DNS resolver detects mDNS (.local) queries in dns_resolve_name_internal() (subsys/net/lib/dns/resolve.c) with memcmp(strrchr(query, '.'), ".local", 7), which always reads a fixed 7 bytes from the suffix pointer. When the resolved hostname's final label is shorter than 7 bytes (e.g. names ending in .org, .com, .net, .io, or a trailing dot), the comparison reads 1-2 bytes past the string's NUL terminator. The hostname (query) is the caller-supplied name passed through the standard getaddrinfo()/dns_get_addr_info()/dns_resolve_name() path and is influenceable by operators or remote inputs (server names from configuration, parsed URLs, or app-facing interfaces). On a tightly-sized buffer with no slack (for example a userspace getaddrinfo call where the hostname is copied with k_usermode_string_alloc_copy to exactly strlen+1 bytes), the over-read crosses the allocation boundary; if that boundary is unmapped (guard page, memory-domain boundary under MPU, or an address sanitizer) the over-read faults, causing a denial of service. The over-read bytes are never returned, so there is no information disclosure. The flaw is compiled only when CONFIG_MDNS_RESOLVER is enabled, exists since v1.10.0, and is fixed by replacing the fixed-length memcmp with a NUL-safe strcmp(ptr, ".local").

Out-of-bounds Read

Zephyr MAX32xx USB UDC NULL Deref Before 4.4.0
CVE-2026-10656 4.6 - Medium - July 05, 2026

The MAX32xxx USB device controller driver (drivers/usb/udc/udc_max32.c, compatible adi_max32_usbhs) dereferenced an endpoint buffer in its OUT and IN transfer-completion handlers without checking it for NULL. udc_event_xfer_out_done() called net_buf_add(buf, ep_request->actlen) immediately after buf = udc_buf_get(ep_cfg), where udc_buf_get() returns NULL when the endpoint FIFO is empty. A transfer-completion event is queued from interrupt context and processed asynchronously by the driver thread; between queuing and processing, the endpoint FIFO can be drained by host-controlled control flow in particular udc_setup_received() drains the EP0 OUT/IN FIFOs whenever a new SETUP packet arrives, and dequeue/disable/purge paths drain it likewise. A USB host that aborts an in-flight EP0 control transfer with a new SETUP packet (legal USB behavior) can therefore cause a stale XFER_OUT_DONE event to be processed against an empty FIFO, producing net_buf_add(NULL, ...), a near-NULL pointer dereference that faults and crashes the device. No authentication is required; the attacker is the USB host the device is connected to (physical bus access). Impact is denial of service (device crash). The defect was introduced when the MAX32 UDC driver was added and shipped in Zephyr v4.4.0. The fix adds NULL-buffer checks that return early with UDC_EVT_ERROR/-ENOBUFS in both the OUT-done and IN-done handlers.

NULL Pointer Dereference

Zephyr 4.24.4 async SNTP UAF via sntp_close_async
CVE-2026-10655 6.5 - Medium - June 30, 2026

The asynchronous SNTP client in Zephyr (subsys/net/lib/sntp/sntp.c, sntp_close_async) closed the UDP socket file descriptor directly from the calling thread immediately after detaching it from the network socket service, without synchronizing with the socket-service poll thread. The socket service thread polls each socket via zvfs_poll, which (in zsock_poll_prepare_ctx) registers a k_poll_event pointing into the socket's net_context (&ctx->recv_q) and then blocks in k_poll without holding a reference or lock. net_context objects are allocated from a fixed pool (contexts[CONFIG_NET_MAX_CONTEXTS]) and reused after close. When sntp_close_async is invoked from a different thread than the poll thread (in the in-tree consumer subsys/net/lib/config/init_clock_sntp.c, the SNTP timeout handler runs on the system workqueue while the socket service thread is blocked in poll on the same fd), the close frees and may reuse the net_context while the poll thread still has a poller node linked into the freed object, resulting in a use-after-free / object confusion of kernel poll structures. The SNTP timeout path is the normal no-response failure mode, so a network peer or off-path attacker who drops or delays the SNTP/NTP response can drive the racing close repeatedly (and periodically with NET_CONFIG_SNTP_INIT_RESYNC). The most likely consequence is a crash of the networking thread (denial of service), with potential memory corruption when the freed context slot is reallocated. The fix defers the close to the socket service thread itself via net_socket_service_close (NET_SOCKET_SERVICE_CLOSE_SOCKETS), so the same thread that polls performs the close, eliminating the race. Affected releases: v4.2.0 through v4.4.0.

Dangling pointer

Zephyr RFCOMM Race Cond in v4.4.0 Causes Session Wedge
CVE-2026-10654 3.1 - Low - June 30, 2026

A race condition in the Zephyr Bluetooth Classic RFCOMM host stack (subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/rfcomm.c) mishandles a simultaneous bidirectional session disconnect. When the local device has initiated a session teardown (state BT_RFCOMM_STATE_DISCONNECTING, DISC sent, RTX timer armed) and the connected peer concurrently sends its own DISC frame for dlci 0, rfcomm_handle_disc() invokes rfcomm_session_disconnected(), which unconditionally forced the session to BT_RFCOMM_STATE_DISCONNECTED without ever calling bt_l2cap_chan_disconnect(). Because the recovery timer was also cancelled and a later UA is ignored in the DISCONNECTED state, the session becomes permanently wedged: the underlying L2CAP channel is never released and the session slot in the fixed bt_rfcomm_pool[CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN] array is never reclaimed (its conn pointer stays set). Subsequent bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() calls on that connection fail with -EINVAL due to the invalid session state, so RFCOMM service is denied for that peer, and repeated occurrences can exhaust the session pool. The DISC frame is peer-controlled over the air, but exploitation requires the peer's DISC to collide with a local-initiated disconnect (a high-complexity timing race). Impact is availability/resource-leak only; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality, or integrity consequence. The defect shipped in released versions (present in v4.4.0 and earlier). The fix only transitions to DISCONNECTED when the session is not already in DISCONNECTING, preserving the proper L2CAP teardown path.

Race Condition

Zephyr net_buf Double-Free Refcount Race (v4.4.0)
CVE-2026-10653 6.4 - Medium - June 30, 2026

The Zephyr net_buf library (lib/net_buf/buf.c) manipulated both of its reference counts -- the per-header buf->ref and the per-data-block ref_count at the start of each variable/heap data allocation -- with plain non-atomic C operators (buf->ref++, if (--buf->ref > 0), if (--(*ref_count))). The API is documented as self-synchronizing: callers may share one buffer across threads (e.g. via k_fifo) and each holder independently calls net_buf_unref() with no surrounding lock. Under true concurrency (SMP, or single-core preemption between the non-atomic load and store while another context unrefs the same buffer), two holders can both observe the same prior reference value and both conclude they are the last reference. For heap/variable-data pools (mem_pool_data_unref/heap_data_unref, used by zbus message subscribers, the IP stack RX/TX buffers when CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE=n, capture, wireguard, ISO-TP and usbip) this produces a double k_heap_free()/k_free() of the same block -- heap-metadata corruption and a use-after-free on the heap-hardening poison pattern. For the per-header refcount the buffer is returned to the pool free LIFO twice for any pool type (including fixed-data pools used by Bluetooth and networking), corrupting the free list so a later allocation hands the same buffer to two owners. The fix converts both refcounts to atomic_inc/atomic_dec (overlaying buf->ref in an atomic_t-sized union and changing the data-block refcount from uint8_t to atomic_t). Impact is gated on genuine concurrency and on an application architecture that shares one buffer among multiple independent unref'ers; the trigger is a refcount/timing race rather than packet content, so an external attacker has at most weak indirect influence over the race window. Affects all Zephyr releases through v4.4.0. This fix is not being backported to v3.7-branch (LTS). The backport was attempted and closed unmerged (#111181): the v3.7 networking tree has diverged from main, and the new atomic word-packing -- together with the assertions it adds -- turns pre-existing v3.7-only reference-counting defects elsewhere in the stack into hard faults, so landing the change faithfully would mean pulling an open-ended set of additional v3.7-only fixes into an LTS branch. v3.7 remains affected. Applications on v3.7 that share one net_buf across threads should serialize their own net_buf_unref() calls rather than rely on the documented self-synchronizing behaviour. The fix is on main and has been backported to v4.3-branch (#110852) and v4.4-branch (#110853).

Double-free

Zephyr RTOS 3.0.0 Bluetooth ISO PDU Len Underflow OOB Read
CVE-2026-9263 6.5 - Medium - June 30, 2026

The Zephyr Bluetooth controller ISO Adaptation Layer (subsys/bluetooth/controller/ll_sw/isoal.c) fails to validate the length field of a framed ISO PDU start segment. Per the Bluetooth specification a start segment (sc=0) always carries a 3-byte time_offset, so its segment-header len must be at least PDU_ISO_SEG_TIMEOFFSET_SIZE (3). isoal_check_seg_header() accepted start segments with len < 3 as valid, and isoal_rx_framed_consume() then computed length = seg_hdr->len - 3 in a uint8_t, underflowing to 253-255 when len is 0-2. That oversized length is passed to isoal_rx_append_to_sdu(), whose copy is clamped only against the destination SDU buffer size, not the source PDU length, so up to ~255 bytes of controller memory beyond the received PDU are copied (via sink_sdu_write_hci()/net_buf_add_mem) into an HCI ISO data packet and delivered to the host. The PDU and its segment headers are entirely attacker-controlled and arrive over the air, reachable through both the CIS and BIS-sync HCI data paths (hci_driver.c) and the vendor data path (ull_iso.c), so a remote CIS peer or a broadcaster the device is synced to can trigger an out-of-bounds read causing information disclosure to the host and potential denial of service (faults or malformed oversized HCI ISO packets). The flaw affects all Zephyr releases since framed ISO reception was introduced in v3.0.0. The fix rejects sc=0 segments with len < 3 in isoal_check_seg_header() and adds a guard before the subtraction in isoal_rx_framed_consume().

Out-of-bounds Read

Stay on top of Security Vulnerabilities

Want an email whenever new vulnerabilities are published for Zephyrproject Zephyr or by Zephyrproject? Click the Watch button to subscribe.

subscribe