Docker Model Runner: Arbitrary Code via config.json (CVE-2026-5843)
CVE-2026-5843 Published on May 22, 2026

Docker Model Runner container-to-host code execution via MLX-LM model_file importlib loading
The MLX inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS uses the MLX-LM library, which unconditionally imports and executes arbitrary Python files from model directories via the model_file configuration field in config.json. When a model's config.json specifies a model_file pointing to a Python file, MLX-LM uses importlib to load and execute it with no trust_remote_code gate or equivalent safety check. The MLX backend runs without sandboxing, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the Docker host as the Docker Desktop user. Any container on the Docker network can trigger this by calling the model-runner.docker.internal API to pull a malicious model from an attacker-controlled OCI registry and request inference.

NVD

Vulnerability Analysis

CVE-2026-5843 can be exploited with local system access, requires user interaction and a small amount of user privileges. This vulnerability is considered to have a low attack complexity. The potential impact of an exploit of this vulnerability is considered to be very high.

Attack Vector:
LOCAL
Attack Complexity:
LOW
Privileges Required:
LOW
User Interaction:
REQUIRED
Scope:
CHANGED
Confidentiality Impact:
HIGH
Integrity Impact:
HIGH
Availability Impact:
HIGH

Weakness Type

Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere

The software imports, requires, or includes executable functionality (such as a library) from a source that is outside of the intended control sphere.


Products Associated with CVE-2026-5843

Want to know whenever a new CVE is published for Docker Desktop? stack.watch will email you.

 

Affected Versions

Docker Desktop: